Economic and social effects of "El Nino"  in Ecuador, 1997-8 by Vos, R.P. (Rob) et al.
1ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF “EL NIÑO” IN ECUADOR, 1997-81
Rob Vos
Secretaria Técnica del Frente Social, Quito Ecuador
Margarita Velasco
And
Edgar Labastida
July 1999
Working Paper 292
                                                
1 This paper is a shortened version of a more extensive report prepared for the Inter-American Development
Bank in Spanish by the same authors (see Vos, Velasco, and De Labastida 1998). The authors thank
Wladymir Brbobich, Mercy Balarezo and Carmen Lucía Sandoval for their research assistance. Helpful
comments on a previous draft by the Ecuadorian authorities, CEPAL, Nora Lustig, Steve Vosti, Michael
Walton, Graham Pyatt, Frances Stewart and Valpy FitzGerald are gratefully acknowledged. Of course, the
authors remain responsible for any remaining errors. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily coincide with the official views of management and directors of the Inter-
American Development Bank or those of the governments of the Bank’s member states.
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe's longest-established centre of higher education and
research in development studies. Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week
diploma courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a
scientific basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of
ISS is disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and
working papers.  The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks
to elicit comments and generate discussion. The series includes the research of staff, PhD
participants and visiting fellows, and outstanding research papers by graduate students.
For further information contact:
ORPAS - Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776
2502LT The Hague - The Netherlands - FAX: +31 70 4260799
E-mail: workingpapers@iss.nl
ISSN 0921-0210
Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author:
2ABSTRACT.
Natural disasters, like the “El Niño” phenomenon often hit hardest on the poor.
Yet it is often difficult to separate the effects on living conditions produced by the
inclement weather conditions from general inadequacies in infrastructure and lack of
economic development. Furthermore, there may be controversy as to how to value
damages due to the natural disaster: just to repair and rehabilitate or to reconstruct to
prevent and enhance development. This methodological problem related to the
measurement of the costs also affects policy choices. How much should one focus on
emergency relief and what can be done to obtain better prevention against recurring
weather shocks such as the El Niño phenomenon? Ecuador’s policy orientation appears to
have been greatly oriented at reactive, relatively untargeted emergency relief, whereas
this study recommends greater emphasis on pro-active and targeted developmental
investment.
This study finds that economic and social costs of “El Niño” in Ecuador have
been substantial. Most economic costs relate to losses of agricultural production and
damages to infrastructure. Increased health risks are most critical in the social sectors.
Close to 300 deaths directly linked to the floods are to be lamented and about a quarter of
the Ecuadorian population has been exposed to increased risk of diseases and mortality.
Outcomes suggest that most of the agricultural income losses be borne by small
farmers in the production of rice, corn, coffee and cocoa and to a lesser extent by
agricultural workers in the sugar cane industry and banana plantations. The overall
impact on the already high poverty incidence in the affected areas could be as large as 10
percentage points. The disaster has also been beneficial to some, in particular the wealthy
shrimp producers who saw productivity go up by over 25%, while banana exporters could
compensate production losses through higher export quota en export prices. Health risks
are greatest in areas with poor sanitary infrastructure and overall social conditions. The
affected areas largely coincide with areas hit in previous occurrences of El Niño, the
previous being in 1982-3.
This study proposes methodologies to identify different types of risks associated
with natural disasters such as El Niño and to establish degrees of vulnerability to such
risks by geographical areas and population groups. This should help to set policy
3priorities towards preventive investment and better protection of the most vulnerable
population.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The natural phenomenon of “El Niño” is a regularly returning change in temperatures of
the Pacific Ocean provoking temporal climatic change around the world.2 Along the South
American coast changes are felt in the form of extremely heavy rainfall causing floods,
landslides and so on often with disastrous consequences. Because they live in poorer homes and
tend to have less access to protective infrastructure such disasters often hit hardest on the poor.
The occurrence of El Niño in Ecuador in 1997-8 cost the lives of at least 286 people and
some 30,000 persons were severely affected by loosing their homes and had to recur to families,
friends or camps to survive. A much larger share of the population has been affected by income
losses as they saw their agricultural lands flooded or went without employment due to stagnation
in economic activity. We estimate that about a quarter of the total population has been severely
exposed to increased health risks related to floods and damage to sanitary infrastructure and the
consequent spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, cholera and other.
In contrast to many other natural disasters, El Niño came pre-announced. Early in 1997 it
was clear that with a large probability the phenomenon would set in around the month of
November and cause extremely heavy rainfall with all the related consequences. Lessons could
be learned from the previous appearance in 1982-3. A contingency plan was ready in July 1997
and the state of emergency was declared at that same point in time, some four months before the
first symptoms announced the actual arrival of “El Niño”. The Ecuadorian authorities had
established a budget for emergency relief and reconstruction of US$ 318 million, of which US$
231 million in the form of loans from multilateral agencies and related counterpart funds.
The paradox of the situation has been that while the Ecuadorian authorities seem to have
felt better prepared than ever (the event of 1982-3 took them by surprise), preventive action and
the preparation for rehabilitation and reconstruction proved surprisingly little effective. In this
study we conclude that authorities did not really learn from the previous experience and failed to
                                                
2 The phenomenon El Niño should not be confused with the ocean current “El Niño” which each year around
Christmas brings warmer seawater to the coasts of Ecuador and Peru, to retreat back to the coast of Mexico around
April. This period marks the rainy season. The phenomenon of El Niño originates in waters near Indonesia. It
returns with a regularity of about once every seven years, but with a maximum delay of 15 years. The previous
occurrence with heavy impact of the phenomenon El Niño in Ecuador was in 1982/3. When referring to “El Niño”
in this study we indistinguishably refer to “the phenomenon”.
2adequately distinguish between the different types of risks associated with the phenomenon and
to identify degrees of vulnerability to such risks of different parts of the population. The
approach to the risks remained remarkably general and untargeted. The Contingency Plan
identified a total of 6.5 million people at risk, that is 57% of the total population, without an
elaboration how to respond to different types of impacts of El Niño: on destroyed houses, loss of
income and production, increased health risks and so on.
The first objective of this study is to analyze the (potential) impact of El Niño in terms of
economic losses and increased health risks, with particular emphasis on the most vulnerable
population groups. We indicate “potential” impact at the time of executing the study (February
and June 1998), the consequences of the disaster were not fully measurable for a lack of output
indicators after the event and due to the fact that the phenomenon had not fully stopped leaving
traces of destruction.
A second objective of the study is to show how the methodology used to differentiate
between risks and vulnerability of different population groups to such risks may help to guide
policies aiming at preventive reconstruction of the affected areas and target the benefits towards
the most vulnerable.
The study concentrates on the following aspects:
• A conceptualization of types of risk and vulnerability associated with El Niño and how to
assess the costs of this type of natural disaster (Section 2).
• An estimation of the economic costs (and benefits!) in terms of foregone earnings to farmers
and agricultural workers, based on an analysis of the vulnerability to weather shocks by crops
and agro-ecological zones.  This analysis is subsequently used to estimate the possible impact
on rural poverty and to identify the rural population that probably has suffered most from the
natural disaster (Section 3).
• Study of the vulnerability to health risks and required preventive action to reduce such
vulnerability (Section 4).
• A summary of the emergency relief and preventive actions taken or programmed by the
authorities and a general assessment of their effectiveness (Section 5).
• Policy conclusions are drawn in Section 6. The discussion there centers around the question
whether one should emphasize disaster relief and income loss compensation programs or
3rather use the natural disaster to reconsider development plans and investment priorities in
order to reduce vulnerability to weather shocks in a more structural way. The conclusions go
in favor the latter solution.
2. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF “EL NIÑO”: WHAT AND WHOSE
COST?
2.1 Methodological considerations
‘It’s because of “El Niño”’, is an often-heard explanation in many parts of the world for
the occurrence of abnormal climatic conditions during 1997 and 1998. While a known natural
phenomenon, it is not always clear to what extent heavy rainfalls and floods or prolonged periods
of draught observed around the world can all be related to “El Niño”.  Also precise indications of
the deviation from normal conditions are not always available.
In the case of Ecuador, the inclement weather conditions and subsequent floods and
landslides that affected most of its coastal regions during 1997-8, undoubtedly are related to the
“El Niño” phenomenon which returns with intervals of between 7 and 15 years. Yet roads,
bridges and drinking water systems suffer annually from some degree of damages during the
normal rainy season and also agricultural producers normally do not harvest a portion of their
crops during periods rural roads are impassable. There is no good record of what these ‘normal’
damages are and hence difficult to measure how much of the destruction in 1997-8 is actually
caused by “El Niño”. Further, some areas have been more heavily affected than others have. Not
always because rainfalls have been more heavy, but because of greater deficiencies in existing
infrastructure. Similarly certain areas have been less affected by increased health risk because of
better coverage of immunizations and sanitation systems. This raises the issue of vulnerability:
some areas and population groups may be more at risk due to “El Niño” than others. It also raises
an issue of how to measure costs: should damages be valued at cost of rehabilitation in the pre-El
Niño condition or at reconstruction costs which give better preventive protection?
Studies of natural disasters are inherently complex and have to deal with important
methodological problems. The first is the uncertainty regarding El Niño. Despite the general
predictability of the El Niño phenomenon, there still remains a considerable degree of
uncertainty regarding how, when and to what degree it will affect areas of potential risk. Based
4on an evaluation of past experience this issue is approached in this study by identifying different
types of risks attached to the phenomenon and the different degrees of vulnerability of
geographical zones and population groups that are likely to be affected by the natural disaster. In
particular, we deal with the vulnerability to agricultural income losses and increased health risks
associated with the environmental damages caused by El Niño. Although the study was executed
while the natural disaster had not fully finished leaving its traces of destruction, the first
indications of the impact showed good consistency with the predictions of the vulnerability
analysis. Hence, the approach should help to more easily identify types of emergency relief and
preventive action to be undertaken, as well as to prioritize among areas and population groups
requiring specific attention to cope with the losses and to target possible preventive
interventions.
The second problem relates to the assessment of costs. Several problems are at stake
here. One is the choice of an appropriate benchmark as suggested above. If one is only interested
in the cost associated with the natural disaster one should be able to (a) distinguish between the
damage caused by the disaster and (b) the “normal” depreciation of capital stock (infrastructure),
production levels or health risk situation. In particular, what should be considered the “normal”
situation in areas subject to other weather shocks or exogenous shocks. Comparison with the
previous or an average year may not be adequate. Another consideration of importance is how to
value damage to natural and physical capital stocks, output losses and foregone earnings. This is
not just a technical issue, but one linked to policy objectives. For instance, damage to
infrastructure could be valued at the cost of full reconstruction, leaving it in a better shape than
before. This can make good sense from a developmental point of view. However, it may also be
subject to political economy problems. If roads and bridges were in a bad shape to begin with,
then the natural disaster would be blamed for poor investments in the past. Costs due to the
natural disaster may thus be ‘exaggerated’ and this “political economy of natural disasters” (see
e.g. Albala-Bertrand 1993; Noll 1996) may easily lead to misguiding disaster-relief policies and
foreign assistance programs. However, if the main policy objective is to achieve developmental
reconstruction of the affected areas such valuation of resource needs may well be justifiable, as
long as it is clear these are distinct from the precise damages caused by the natural disaster.
5Two more methodological problems associated with cost assessments should be
considered. First, one has to distinguish between direct and indirect losers. Farmers may have
lost a harvest as a direct consequence of El Niño, but consumers and agro-industries may be
indirect losers as food prices may have increased and/or supply of inputs has stagnated. The
analysis of identifying direct and indirect effects is further complicated by market responses to
the natural disaster, e.g. farmers may find some compensation for output losses through higher
food prices, transporters affected by damaged roads through higher freight fees. Second, one has
to distinguish losses from delays. In agriculture, for instance, losses will be associated with labor
that went unused and output of crops that could not be harvested. There would be delays if
sowing and harvesting have been delayed in response to El Niño.
In this study, the costing problem is dealt with at two levels. First, an estimation of the
direct cost of the damages (to the extent valuable in monetary terms) and second, in function of
the type of vulnerability, some estimates are made of possible costs of reconstruction which
would provide greater protection.
On costs (section 3), we restrict ourselves to estimate what we define as direct costs, that
is the economic costs (in the form of foregone earnings and/or rehabilitation of damaged
infrastructure to its functional state prior to El Niño). Hence we do not try to estimate indirect
costs which may result through input-output links or through absolute and relative price effects
by which production losses in one sector spill over to others. To do this properly a general
equilibrium model would be required, an exercise clearly beyond the scope of this study.
Since no disaggregated data derived from direct observation are available, we need to
identify areas and population groups by their vulnerability to the (potential) impact of El Niño.
We focus in particular on two main types of vulnerability associated with “El Niño”: that
affecting agricultural production and incomes and that raising health risks.
2.2 Identifying the vulnerable population in Ecuador
The official policy orientation in Ecuador has focused on the environmental risks linked
to the phenomenon itself, that is the risks associated with heavy rainfall, storms and spring-tides.
These may provoke floods, landslides, rupture of dikes, and so on, which in turn will affect
6roads, sanitation systems and other types of infrastructure as well as may put in danger the lives
and health conditions of people.
The experience of the effects of El Niño in 1982-3 served as a basis to identify the areas
of major potential risk by type of natural cause. The Defensa Civil (Civil Defense) was
designated with organizing preventive action and by July 1997 it had identified 93 cantones
(municipalities), of which 77 belonged to the provinces of the Costa (the tropical lowlands
bordering the Pacific Ocean) (see Table 1). Later on, 12 more cantons were added to reach a total
of 105 potentially affected municipalities with an aggregate population of 6.5 million, that is
57% of the country’s population was considered to be at risk (see Table 2).
This official ‘map’ of vulnerable areas was meant to orient humanitarian emergency
action for the affected population, preventive health actions, and the rehabilitation of
infrastructure. Evacuating and assisting people in emergency situations and maintain flooded
areas accessible was the main worry of the Defensa Civil, but other agencies, such as the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Works and local authorities had to rely on the same
information.
7Table 1
‘Official Map’ of potentially affected areas due to environmental risks associated with the
phenomenon of El Niño, 1997-8
(number of potentially affected cantones in provinces of the Costa)
TYPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK
GUAYAS
27 cantons
LOS RIOS
11 cantons
EL ORO
14 cantons
MANABI
19 cantons
ESMERALDAS
 6 cantons
Maximum risk of flooding 4 4 - -
Very vulnerable to tamping of
draining and sewerage systems
16 6 11 13 2
Only torrential rains 6 - 8 - 1
Spring-tides 6 - 3 7 4
Overflowing of rivers 2 2 8 9 7
AFFECTED HYDROGRAPHIC
BASINS
Río Guayas and
micro-basins
Basin (delta) of
Río Guayas
Lower parts of
river basins
Jubones, Santa
Rosa and
Pagua.
Chone and
Portoviejo
Santiago-
Cayapas,
Ostiones, Mata
and lower part
of Muisne
* Some cantons are affected by more than one type of risk at a time.
Source: Defensa Civil del Ecuador, (July 1997); and  Secretaría Técnica del Frente Social (SIISE),
Cronología del fenómeno de El Niño en base al Periódico Hoy, 1982-1983 (febrero 1998).
Table 2
Potentially affected municipalities (cantons) and population by phenomenon of El Niño,
1997-8
No. of
affected
cantons
Total
population
(millions)
According to: Defensa Civil 105 6.5
According to: This Study
  Vulnerable to agricultural income losses 39 1.2
     (of which: poor)1 39 0.9
  Vulnerable to increased health risk 65 5.3
    (of which: very vulnerable)2 52 2.5
Memo:
Total population Ecuador (Nov. 1997) 11.2
Total population Costa provinces 5.6
Source: Defensa Civil (1997) and text.
Notes:
1. Population with consumption level below poverty line of US$ 61 per person, per month in
1997
2. Population of cantons with an index of social and sanitation conditions (ICSS) below the
national average. See text.
8The problem with this approach is that by mainly focusing on the environmental risks the
authorities were unable to properly distinguish between types of vulnerability: that is which areas
and population groups would be more affected by losses in agricultural production, infrastructure
and increased prevalence of diseases and mortality.
In this paper we focus on two types of vulnerability which are the most relevant in
relation to the consequences of El Niño:
• vulnerability to income losses, in particular due to damages to agricultural production and
infrastructure
• vulnerability to increased health risk
As shown by Table 2, this still implies that a large part of the Ecuadorian population has
been exposed to severe income losses and enhanced health risks. We estimate the population
most at risk to be 0.9 million people with strongly worsened economic conditions and 2.5 million
people exposed to greater health risks. The population vulnerable to income losses and those
with enhanced health risk due to El Niño overlap to a great extent.
By focusing on risk factors this analysis of vulnerability is particularly useful for guiding
preventive action. At the same time, mid-way 1998 when this study was completed no adequate
information is available to evaluate the precise impact of El Niño on living standards of the
population in the affected areas. Hence we use the vulnerability analysis also to project the likely
impact of El Niño on rural poverty and to locate priority areas for repair and reconstruction of
sanitary infrastructure and health services.
To identify agricultural vulnerability we combine the following types of information on
arable land: (i) the risk of floods; (ii) the location of rivers and river basins and the vulnerability
to overflowing due to heavy rainfall; (iii) actual and potential land use by crops; and (iv)
distribution of land by size of land holdings.
Map No. 1 gives a global sketch of the most vulnerable areas, in particular of the
cultivated areas of the basin of the river Guayas. The inserts locate the area and indicate the
affected areas during the 1982-3 episode of El Niño and that of 1997-8. Map No. 1 is not
sufficiently detailed for the agricultural vulnerability analysis. The identified zones are
heterogeneous in terms of altitude, water control systems and land use. For a proper analysis
geographic maps which can identify land use and altitude levels at intervals of 5 meters (at least
9for the low lands). Such maps have not been elaborated for the risk zones in Ecuador, even
though this would be technically feasible using available aerial photography. This would also be
the appropriate technique to monitor the affected areas due to El Niño, but unfortunately the
relevant authorities have not made use of it. Due to limited time and the high costs involved, we
only used the source for a small area. For mapping out the total vulnerable area we used
available cartography and data on land use from various sources and fieldwork reports. The
vulnerable areas were subdivided into large agro-ecological zones (Vos, Velasco and De
Labastida 1998): (a) terraces and alluvial levels (vulnerable to overflowing of rivers); (b) the
Guayas river basin (very sensitive to flooding); (c) the lower slopes of the Western cordillera
(sensitive to torrential rains and overflowing river levels); and (d) coastal border (sensitive to sea
water erosion and spring tides).
10
Map No. 1: Agricultural vulnerability to El Niño (Guayas River Basin)
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For each of these the most vulnerable areas were defined (using also altitude levels) and
combined with information on agricultural production and land use at the (administrative) level
of cantons. Although the political-administrative delimitation of provinces and cantons does not
precisely coincide with the four agro-ecological zones defined above, it does allow to combine
the information on land use and vulnerability to flooding with other socio-economic information
at the local level. Using the poverty map for Ecuador (Larrea and others 1996), we add
information on poverty incidence in the (potentially) affected agricultural zones to identify the
most vulnerable population to agricultural income losses at the level of cantons. This way we
obtain a total rural population vulnerable to agricultural losses for 39 cantons of 1.2 million
(Table 2). Of these, 73% are estimated to have per capita consumption levels below a poverty
line of US$ 61 per person, per month (at 1997 prices).3
Also in health we look for structural risk factors. Based on an analysis of the observable
deterioration in health conditions following El Niño in 1982-3, we construct a composite index
defining the social and sanitary conditions (ICSS) surrounding the population in the potentially
affected areas. Using a principal components analysis we find four determinants strongly
associated with the likelihood of suffering increased health risk due to El Niño (Velasco and
others 1998): (1) access to drinking water; (2) access to adequate sewerage systems; (3)
overcrowdedness of housing and (4) adult functional illiteracy.  The resulting index has a range
of 0 to 100. The lower the ICSS the greater the expected health risks. Applying the ICSS to the
105 potentially cantons we identify the size of the population with high vulnerability to health
risks at 2.5 million (Table 2). Subsequently, as explained in Section 4, we combine this
information with available data on actual damages to social infrastructure, increase in infectious
diseases, deaths and so on due to El Niño as well as with data on available health services to
identify priority actions, both preventive action and reconstruction.
                                                
3 The indicated poverty line is taken from the World Bank poverty study of Ecuador (World Bank 1996).
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3. ESTIMATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF DAMAGES IN THE
RURAL SECTOR CAUSED BY THE PHENOMENON OF EL NIÑO IN 1997-8
3.1 Total foregone earnings in agriculture
Agriculture has been, next to roads and transportation, the main economic sector having
suffered damages due to the El Niño event (Table 3). Even though by June 1998 not all effects
were visible, total expected net losses, valued in terms of foregone earnings (see below), are
estimated at US$ 112.3 million (or 4.7% of agricultural GDP and 0.6% of total GDP).  While
substantial, these losses are considerably lower than those of a CEPAL study (CEPAL 1998)
conducted around the same time as the present study. CEPAL estimates damages in agriculture
as high as US$ 966 million which would be the equivalent of 37.6% of agricultural GDP and
4.8% of total GDP. Differences in the identification of the actually flooded areas and differences
in valuation methodology explain the large discrepancy. Our lower estimate is in part due to a
greater precision in identifying the actually flooded areas at an adequate level of topographic
detail as proposed in Section 2. Foregone earnings in this study have been valued in terms of
value added, rather than total production costs as in the CEPAL study. In effect in the case of
most annual crops production (and harvesting) was delayed thus not incurring much of the
intermediate input costs. Further, we used ‘pre-El Niño’ off-farm and market prices
differentiated by the ‘normal’ market orientation of the produce (domestic or external), whereas
in the CEPAL study mostly export prices were used. These methodological differences are
detailed further in an extended version of this study (Vos, Velasco and De Labastida 1998:
Annex 1).
As indicated by Table 3, besides costs, El Niño has brought also some important benefits
to agriculture and fishing. Rainfall in normally dry areas has yielded productivity increases for
some agricultural crops. The most noticeable gains can be observed, however, in (on land)
shrimp farming, where damages to the fishing pools have been limited, while the warmer
waters have allowed for substantial productivity gains due to increased natural larva production.
Shrimp production and exports have been up by 26% during November 1997 and June 1998 as
compared to the same period in 1996-7 (see Vos, Velasco and De Labastida 1998: Table 8). The
gains in shrimp production partly offset losses in agriculture, however these gains accrue to the
13
wealthy large-scale shrimp farmers and exporters, while the agricultural losses have fallen
mainly on the poorer farmers and agricultural laborers.
 Table 3
Estimation of the overall direct costs of the damages caused by the phenomenon of “El
Niño”,1997-8
(values in millions of US dollars)
1997-8 (until June 1998)
Costs Benefits Net Costs
Agriculture 182.3 15.3 167.0
   Farmers-owners 50.8 6.7 44.1
   Agricultural workers 73.9 73.9
   Domestic traders 57.6 8.6 49.0
Livestock 7.7 7.7
   Livestock farmers-owners 2.4 2.4
   Wage-earners in livestock 2.7 2.7
Shrimp farming 7.5 75.5 -68.1
Fishing 12.4 6.7 5.7
   Traditional fishing 12.4 12.4
   Industrial fishing boats 6.7 -6.7
Total Agriculture, Livestock
and Fishing
209.9 97.5 112.3
  (% of agricultural GDP) 8.8% 4.1% 4.7%
 (% of total GDP) 1.1% 0.5% 0.6%
Sources: Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998).
Although our estimates of the costs are much modest than those produced by the
Ecuadorian authorities and by CEPAL, agricultural income losses nevertheless have been
substantial to groups of farmers. The most heavily affected crops are rice, corn, and sugar cane
which are mainly produced for the domestic market and the export crops bananas and coffee (see
Table 4). About 14% of the total area under cultivation in the affected provinces suffered from
damages and production losses. Rice, corn and coffee are mainly grown by small-scale producers
at family-owned farms and make relatively intensive use of family and hired labor. Self-
employed farmers and workers in those sectors had to cope with important income losses
impacting on the poverty rates in the affected regions, as we shall see in more detail below.
Banana and sugar cane are mostly produced on large plantations in Ecuador’s lowlands.
While relatively extensive in labor use some 12,000 workers have temporarily lost their jobs in
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those sectors due to El Niño of 1997-8. Owners of banana plantations have incurred production
losses due to the natural disaster. However, at the same time, they saw an increase in the export
value thanks to an increase in export prices and an increase in export quota to the European
Union.  Sugar cane has been heavily affected. Production on some 53% of the cultivated area
could not be harvested. About 90% of all sugarcane are produced at three large industrial estates
(ingenios) which operate with seasonal workers. Workers have been put out of work, but the
estate owners obtained some compensation as the government gave them exclusive permit to
commercialize and distribute imported sugar.
Agricultural income losses due to El Niño thus seem to be severe. The impact on living
conditions has been compounded by damages to the transport infrastructure, housing and
sanitation systems and overall macroeconomic effects.
Table 4
Agricultural losses by main crops, 1997-98
(values of costs in thousands of US$)
TOTAL
CULTIVATE
D AREA
AFFECTED
AREA
VALUE ADDED OF LOST
PRODUCE (factor prices)
TOTAL VALUE OF
PRODUCTION OF LOST
PRODUCE
$ x 103
CROP Sep. 97 Niño 97-98 TOTAL Wages Surplus  At producer Trade At market
Ha         Ha % $ x 103 $ x 103 $ x 103 Prices margin. prices
Rice 337,500 105,336 31.2% 35,577 28,413 7,164 39,527 10,410 49,937
Banana 186,880 25,380 13.6% 19,171 3,562 15,609 82,485 25,322 107,807
Corn 293,800 130,676 44.5% 19,285 13,148 6,137 36,318 8,017 44,336
Cocoa 260,230 49,290 18.9% 8,961 7,366 1,595 16,736 1,753 18,489
Coffee 249,130 74,640 30.0% 12,543 7,511 5,031 30,070 5,792 35,862
Sugar cane 51,800 27,540 53.2% 13,907 5,370 8,537 32,965 1,977 34,942
Pasture 2,335,000 82,487 3.5% 5,074 2,678 2,396 17,995 0 17,995
Other 93,000 45,340 48.8% 10,223 5,891 4,332 17,740 4,317 22,058
TOTAL 3,807,340 540,689 14.2% 124,741 73,939 50,802 273,837 57,588 331,425
Source: Vos, Velasco y De Labastida (1998), based on: MAG (DINAREN, DISPLASEDE, Direcciones
Provinciales); Banco Central; INEC (SEAN); CLIRSEN; FAO; Cámaras de Agricultura; own
fieldwork
Note: Includes damages in 5 provinces of the coastal area (Costa) plus tropical zones of provinces Cañar and
Bolívar, which for their main part belong to the highlands (Sierra).
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El Niño has left the coastal road infrastructure in a poor condition. However, it should
be indicated that much of the road system was in a pretty bad shape to begin with (see also
CEPAL 1998). Most transportation connection over land consist of unpaved secondary and
tertiary roads (some 9,000 km) which even during the normal rainy season are locked out for
weeks or months. The main road system (some 2,500 km) has suffered severe damages and
only on specific spots. Our own assessment of the damages lead us to assume that only some 60
kilometers require complete reconstruction, while some 400 km are in need of partial repair.
Ten bridges have fully collapsed and the cost of rebuilding these constitutes about half of the
estimated damages to the transport infrastructure valued at US$ 204 million (see Vos, Velasco
and De Labastida 1998). CEPAL (1998) also reports substantial income losses for transporters
due to higher operation costs and losses of cargo by transport operators. Our own fieldwork and
interviews with transporters suggest that vehicles indeed have operated at higher variable costs
and some shipments have had to be foregone. Yet in all (main) roads have remained accessible
during the period of the disaster and prices have been raised to make up for the increase in
operational costs. Overall it is not clear how much income losses have been actually incurred
by the transport sector and for the analysis of the poverty impact in rural areas we were thus
unable to consider these costs.
Costs to other economic sectors seem to have been relatively small compared to
agriculture and transport. The estimated damages to social infrastructure mainly relate to the cost
of destroyed or affected resident dwellings, water supply and sanitation systems, hospitals and
health centers and schools (Vos, Velasco and De Labastida 1998: section 4.4). All these costs
were estimated at unit prices of rehabilitation to the state prior to El Niño. Some 14,000 homes
were fully or partially destroyed mainly those of the poorest population and the cost of
rehabilitation is estimated at about US$ 35 million. Probably more important than the damages to
health-related infrastructure as such are the increased health risks associated with poor sanitary
conditions and ill-functioning health services. Such increased health risks not just occur because
of damaged social infrastructure, but in many regions because of a structural lack of it. We deal
with the consequences of the losses in social infrastructure in the section on health (section 4).
Direct economic costs of El Niño in agriculture and transportation infrastructure thus
appear to be substantial enough to affect macroeconomic indicators. Clearly, the natural disaster
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has come at a bad moment. The most serious attempts to date towards macroeconomic
stabilization of the Ecuadorian economy in the mid-1990s (see Jácome, Larrea and Vos 1998)
were already heavily tested by the strong drop in oil prices in 1997. Oil is the country’s main
export product and oil revenues have a strong direct impact on the fiscal balance and the overall
growth rate. Estimates for economic growth suggest a drop in GDP of the first two quarters of
1998 to 0.6%, down from 2% growth achieved in the first half of 1997. Overall growth for 1998
was 2.2%, somewhat below the average rate of the 1990s (2.7%). Overall inflation reached 34%
per annum in July 1998, up from 30% for 1997.4
It is difficult to trace the precise impact of El Niño on these macroeconomic indicators
due to the presence of other external shocks. The fiscal deficit has increased in the first half of
1998 due to a further drop in oil prices and a loosening of spending controls in face of the
presidential and congressional elections held in May. This may have caused the additional
inflationary pressure as much as the drop in the supply of agricultural products. Central Bank
data indicate a fall in agricultural GDP by 1.3% in the first two quarters of 1998 compared to the
first half of 1997. Output also has fallen in the oil and construction sectors, but in contrast other
sectors like transport (!) and electricity showed an increase in their rate of growth despite of the
presence of El Niño, while the growth impact on other urban sectors seems to have been minor.
A major consequence of El Niño in 1982-3 was a steep rise in food prices. This has not
occurred in 1997-8. Food prices have risen from 35% at the end of 1997 to 43% in July 1998
(annual rates), but far from the dramatic increase observed in the previous decade. It may also be
a confirmation that the agricultural damages are not as big as suggested by the estimates of the
Ecuadorian authorities and CEPAL. One should add though that timely increases in imports of
basic food crops such as rice and sugar have weakened the upward pressure on food prices.
Further there has been no apparent major impact on the urban economy. The urban population
has suffered from a rise in food
 prices, but  this rise has been far from dramatic. Fully comparable data on urban employment
were not available by June 1998. Yet two different labor force surveys held in November 1997
                                                
4 Estimates of Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletín de Coyuntura, http://www.bce.fin.ec, August 1998
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and April 1998, respectively, indicate that urban unemployment has not increased in that period
and may even have slightly dropped.5
In all, the El Niño phenomenon has brought substantial economic damages. The exact
macroeconomic impact is difficult to estimate due to the presence of other external shocks, but
seems to have been by and large limited to the agricultural sector. The analysis also suggests that
the costs (and benefits!) of El Niño appear unequally distributed. To the extent there have been
benefits, such as in the production and exports of shrimp, these almost entirely accrue to the rich
owners of the large-scale shrimp farms. Plantation owners in banana and sugar cane production
have suffered significant production losses, however these saw compensation in the form of a
rise in export prices and quota in the case of banana and of an exclusive right to commercialize
imported sugar in case of the sugar estates.
The main losers in the process appear to be the self-employed farmers and agricultural
workers in rice, corn, banana, coffee, sugar cane and other small crops for the domestic market.
In the remainder of this section we will try to identify the location of the most affected farmers
and estimate the likely impact of the income losses on rural poverty.
3.2 The impact of El Niño on rural employment and poverty
A close relationship has been observed between land distribution and rural poverty (Vos
1985; Barreiros and others 1987; World Bank 1996). Less access to land is
associated with less access to credits and modern agricultural inputs and so with lower
agricultural incomes.
Table 4 showed that, in absolute terms, the major agricultural income losses due to El
Niño can be observed in the production of rice (US$ 36 million), followed at some distance by
corn (maíz duro) (US$ 19 million), export bananas (US$ 19 million), sugarcane (US$ 13 million)
and coffee (US$ 12 million). Most sugarcane and banana production for exports is produced at
                                                
5 Both the regular urban employment survey of INEC (November 1997) and a new urban labor force survey
conducted by the Universidad Católica of Quito (April 1998) report an open unemployment rate in the major cities
of around 9%. The CEPAL study (CEPAL 1998) and official reports (e.g. COPEFEN 1998) also cite these surveys
and report a steep increase in urban unemployment (to around 17%). This outcome was based, however, on the
provisional, unpublished data from the April 1998 survey, where the error was made to classify housewives not
actively seeking work as unemployed. After correction of this error, he open employment rate in the major cities is
about 9% in April 1998, somewhat below the rate observed in November 1997.
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large scale plantations of over 100 hectares. The other crops (rice, coffee and cocoa) are mainly
produced at small- or medium-scale family farms, while corn is predominantly small-scale
production at plots of less than 5 hectares. Also in livestock production the poorer farmers are
the most affected as these lack the resources to move cattle to areas safe of floods.
There are no direct survey data to obtain a direct measure of lost employment in
agriculture and the rural sector at large. However, it is possible to estimate the likely loss in full-
time equivalent employment from microeconomic information on labor use per hectare by crop
and by technology level and apply the derived parameters to the affected cultivated areas.
Results are shown in Table 5. Clearly the data refer to direct employment losses in agriculture
due to the reduced area that has been cultivated and/or harvested during November 1997 and
May 1998. Demand for agricultural labor likely has fallen by some 56,000 man-years, probably
affecting about 112,000 agricultural workers or about 11% of the economically active population
in rural areas in the Costa. About half of the affected workers are wage earners (most contract
workers in sugar cane and banana plantations), one-third temporary hired workers (mostly in rice
production) and the remainder paid family workers. Applying mean daily wage rates by area and
crop, we estimate that the total foregone earnings of the affected workers is in the order of US$
73,9 million which amounts to about US$ 650 per worker.
Table 5 gives the estimate of likely losses in wage income of agricultural workers, based
on our method to estimate of production losses using the identification of areas vulnerable to
flooding (section 2) and parameters regarding labor use by crop and land size. Rural surveys are
scarce in Ecuador and information systems on land use and agricultural production are
incomplete or have been abandoned for a lack of resources in recent years (such as the SEAN).
Hence it may be difficult to confirm the estimates of Table 5 through direct observation and one
has to rely on indirect measurement methods as the one used here.
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 Table 5
 Employment losses and related foregone earnings1 in agriculture
 CROP  AFFECTED
AREA
 LOSS OF DIRECT
EMPLOYMENT
 FOREGONE
WAGE
EARNINGS1
  Has  Affected
workers
 Increase in
unemployment
(man-years)
 US$ million
Pasture 82,487 4,126 2,063 2.7
Rice 105,336 43,716 21,858 28.4
Corn (maíz duro) 130,676 20,228 10,114 13.1
Banana 25,380 3,427 1,714 3.6
Sugar cane 27,540 8,262 4,131 5.4
Coffee 74,640 11,556 5,778 7.5
Cocoa 49,290 11,332 5,666 7.4
Other 45,340 9,071 4,536 5.9
TOTAL 540,689 111,718 55,859 73.9
 Source: Table 4; Ministry of Agriculture (MAG); MAG-ORSTOM; and Vos, Velasco and De Labastida
(1998).
Note:    1. Refers to foregone earnings in terms of wages only. See Table 3 for total agricultural income
losses.
Measurement of the (possible) impact on rural poverty has to rely, for the same reasons,
on indirect methods. To obtain an idea of the potential impact on rural poverty the following
sources and procedures were used:
• Income and consumption data from the 1995 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (LSMS) were
used as well as the projection of per capita consumption and poverty data at the level of
cantons as produced for the Poverty Map for Ecuador (see Larrea and others, 1996).6
• Poverty indices are derived using consumption levels and a poverty line of US$ 61 per
person per month as established by the poverty study of the World Bank (1996).
• Consumption data for 1995 were updated for the affected cantons to projected values at
November 1997 prices, using the overall consumer price index and the average growth rate
of agricultural value added between 1995 and 1997.
                                                
6   The methodology applied in Larrea et al. (1996) is similar to that applied in other countries of the region. It uses
an econometric analysis to identify determinants of urban and rural consumption levels and poverty rates using the
LSMS survey data at the national and regional level (Costa, Sierra, Oriente). The results are then used to project
consumption and poverty at the municipal level substituting data on the determinants such as education and other
socio-economic characteristics as derived from the population census into the estimated regression functions.
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• It is assumed that the poverty-growth elasticity for the rural population is –1 (see Jácome,
Larrea and Vos 1998, for a justification of this elasticity).
• Losses of value added accruing to owners (surplus) and traders (trade margins) are also
included in the estimate of the impact on poverty, except in the cases of banana and
sugarcane where large scale (non-poor) ownership dominates and where also trading is
mostly controlled by the same large landowners or by wealthy trading firms. Moreover, most
of the landowners in export banana and sugar cane production typically do not reside in rural
areas.
Before the natural disaster, poverty already affected a major share of the rural population
in the areas hit by El Niño. The rural poverty incidence in those areas was about 73% (Table 6).
We estimate that, under the given assumptions, the agricultural income losses due to El Niño
may have led to a rise in the poverty incidence by about 11 percentage points. This implies that
the living standard of an additional 120 thousand inhabitants has fallen below the subsistence
level.
El Niño has hit hardest on the rural population in the province Los Ríos where many
farmers are engaged in the production of rice and corn. Foregone agricultural incomes amount to
25% of mean consumption of rural households in this province and we estimate a rise in the rural
poverty incidence by 18.6% points, increasing the number of poor by 53,000.
Another severely affected area is the countryside in the Guayas province where the rural
population is expected to have lost about 14% of its resources to satisfy basic human needs. The
number of people below the poverty line likely increased by 10% (21,500 persons). In Guayas,
self-employed and workers in the production of rice as well as wage earners in sugar cane are
seen to be most affected. The third most affected province is Manabí where rural poverty is
expected to have increased by 35,000 people (8%). There the most affected are small producers
of coffee and corn.
Using the more detailed information at the level of cantons and combining the
information on the expected poverty impact and the most vulnerable cultivated areas to flooding
(see section 2), one may obtain a ranking of most affected areas by agricultural income losses.
These areas are not only identifiable by degree of poverty, but also by main type of agricultural
production and zone of agricultural vulnerability. A provisional ranking of cantons can be found
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in Table A.1.7  Clearly, the cantons with the higher poverty incidence predominantly depend on
the production of the most affected crops by El Niño, i.e. rice and corn, and to a somewhat lesser
degree those that are dependent on coffee and cocoa production. In all most vulnerable regions
the family-based farming on small plots is the most common mode of production. Poverty rates
tend to be lower in areas where banana and sugarcane production is most important and where
agricultural wage earners are the most affected socio-economic group. Using this ranking we
may identify the most vulnerable population groups by cantons as follows (see Table A.2):
• Self-employed farmers and families (rice, corn, coffee, cocoa, livestock, other crops):
cantons of Bolívar, Chone, Santa Ana, Jipijapa, Tosagua, Sucre and Rocafuerte in the
province of Manabí; Esmeraldas and Quinindé in the province of Esmeraldas; Vinces,
Palenque, Quevedo, Ventanas, Baba and Babahoyo in Los Ríos; La Trocal in Cañar; and
Palestina, Samborondon and Urbina Jado in Guayas.
• Agricultural workers (wage earners) (sugarcane and banana): cantons Quinindé
(Esmeraldas); Baba and Babahoyo (Los Ríos); La Troncal (Cañar/Guayas); El Triunfo and
Naranjito (Guayas); El Guabo, Pasaje and Santa Rosa (El Oro).
The government’s Contingency Plan containing the guidelines as to how to respond to
the impact of the disaster defined a much larger number of potentially affected cantons.
However, the Plan failed to differentiate the affected zones by the degree of agricultural
vulnerability to the consequences of El Niño. The above analysis allows to do so, thereby
providing a tool for targeting possible intervention to compensate for income losses and/or for
targeting preventive action to reduce vulnerability to future weather shocks like El Niño. We turn
to the policy implications in Section 5.
                                                
7 This is a provisional ranking for two reasons. First, some cantons could not be included in the analysis as these are
newly created (i.e. after 1990) and for which no information is available about land use and the ructure of
agricultural production. Secondly, for the design of policy interventions one may wish to add other criteria than
those applied here.
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Table 6
  Impact of El Niño on Rural Poverty in the affected Municipalities (cantons) in the provinces of the Costa
(values are per capita and in US$ of 1997)
Before El Niño Economic impact of El Niño in affected areas  (US$
of 1997 per capita)
Impact El Niño on Rural Poverty
Rural
population
of affected
cantons
Poverty
incidence
(rural)
Incidence
of extreme
poverty
(rural)
Annual
consumpti
on
per capita
Total
agricultural
income
losses (per
capita)
Forgone
wage
earnings
(per
capita)
Forgone
self-
employed
income
per capita
Foregone
trade
margins
(per
capita)
Impact on
consumpti
on (%)
Poverty
incidence
after El
Niño
Increase
in poverty
incidence
(% points)
Extreme
poverty
incidence
after El
Niño
Increase
extreme
poverty
(%
points)
El Oro 78,992 57.4% 10.7% 962 41 26 6 8 4.3% 59.1% +1.7% 11.1% +0.5%
Esmeraldas 172,809 76.4% 28.5% 615 9 7 1 1 1.4% 76.9% +0.5% 28.9% +0.4%
Guayas 215,739 68.4% 17.5% 666 91 58 14 20 13.7% 78.2% +9.8% 19.9% +2.4%
Los Ríos 285,898 75.4% 22.9% 608 153 87 29 37 25.2% 94.0% +18.6% 28.7% +5.8%
Manabí 431,090 75.5% 25.9% 593 55 28 13 14 9.3% 83.6% +8.1% 28.3% +2.4%
Total affected areas 1,184,528 73.1% 25.5% 599 77 44 15 18 12.9% 84.3% +11.2% 28.8% +3.3%
Memo
Total provinces of Costa 1,793,384 72.7% 22.3% 647
Total country 4,667,116 74.9% 24.6% 591
Source: Tables 4 and 5; INEC, Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 1995; STFS, Poverty Map (Larrea and others 1996); Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998).
Note: See text for estimation methodology.
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4. IMPACT OF EL NIÑO ON HEALTH RISKS: NATURAL DISASTER OR
DISASTER OF HEALTH POLICIES?
El Niño is also a source of increased health risks in the form of increased disease
prevalence and infant mortality rates. Floods and standing water are sources of malaria
among other infectious diseases. Damages to drinking water and sanitation systems
increase the risk of diarrhea, dengue fever and cholera. The agricultural income losses
leading to increased rural poverty, in turn are a cause of increased malnutrition, which is
an important cause of high infant mortality rates.
The experience with the El Niño phenomenon in 1982-3 confirmed the
association of the indicated factors. This reality is compounded by the fact that important
parts of the affected areas suffer from great deficiencies in sanitary infrastructure to start
with, as well as from inadequate coverage of immunizations, reduced access to health
services and low educational levels.
There is no timely and adequate statistical information available (by June 1998) to
study the changes in the epidemiological profile and infant mortality rates after El Niño
of 1997-8. Instead, we apply the methodology of identifying areas of vulnerability to
health risks as suggested in Section 2. Ex-post testing of this methodology to the changes
in health conditions due to El Niño of 1982-3, showed a high degree of consistency
between health vulnerability areas and observed deterioration of health conditions and
prevalence of diseases (Velasco and others 1998; Vos, Velasco and De Labastida 1998).
This suggests that preventive health interventions to counteract the effects of El Niño in
1997-8 could well have benefited from this approach. We will also argue that
interventions of rehabilitation and preventive action for new occurrences may well be
served by this methodology.
Past experience and existing evidence indicates that:
• The El Niño event tends to enhance the incidence of malaria and other infectious
diseases, which are strongly related to poor sanitary conditions. In 1982-3 the number
of cases of malaria increased steeply and it took more than a decade to bring the
prevalence of the disease back to levels of the early 1980s (see Figure 1). In 1997
some 17,000 cases were reported and in the first five month of 1998 5,935 cases, a
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significant increase from levels in the preceding year. Also ‘new’ diseases8 have
spread such as leptospirosis, cholera and dengue. The highest concentration of these
diseases has been found in areas where sanitation systems broke down due to El
Niño, in particular in the poorer neighborhoods of the cities of Guayaquil, Bahía,
Chone and Machala.
• In 1982-3 infant mortality increased substantially in the regions hit by El Niño. The
infant mortality rate increased from 52 to 65 per thousand live births in the affected
provinces before and after the disaster (Vos, Velasco and De Labastida 1998). A drop
in the coverage of immunizations in 1983 exacerbated the rise in child mortality.
Vaccination campaigns in subsequent years have helped to reduce infant mortality.
Figure 1: Trends in malaria prevalence, 1965-98
(number of cases)
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• In November 1997 the Ministry of Public Health ordered a number of measures of
preventive action. These included an intensification of the vaccination program in the
                                                
8 That is diseases that were virtually eradicated before 1990.
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potentially affected areas and the application of insecticides to combat malaria.
Probably this has helped to mitigate some of the potential impact of El Niño. It
remains yet to be seen to what extent infant mortality has been contained by these
measures. Nevertheless, the general impression is that preventive action has fallen
short, as resources have been limited and no instruments to target actions to the more
vulnerable population groups were in place (Velasco and others 1998). Furthermore,
over time too little was done to improve other critical conditions preventing spread of
infectious diseases and premature child deaths including adequate sanitary conditions,
poverty reduction and reducing malnutrition.
To identify the more vulnerable population to increased health risk, we construct
a composite Index of Social and Sanitary Conditions (ICSS). The ICSS has been
constructed applying a principal component analysis to a range of determinants found to
be strongly associated with the prevalence of infectious diseases and infant mortality.9 On
the basis of this analysis the ICSS has been composed of four variables: access to safe
drinking water, access to sewerage systems, functional illiteracy among the adult
population and the degree of overcrowdedness of housing. The index has a range of 0 to
100. The higher the index, the better the social and sanitary conditions to withstand the
health risks associated with El Niño.
The ICSS was applied to data from the 1982 population census and was found to
predict with fairly great accuracy which cantons suffered from an increase in infant
                                                
9 Principal component analysis is a method to provide a metric to different components of a variable (if of
different dimensions) by giving weights to the different components according to their contribution to the
“principal component”. In order to get there one has to choose a set of indicators which are considered to
be determinants of – in this case – health conditions, but whose problem is their interdependence (and
hence not usable in OLS regression). The first component represents the dimension of maximal variability
in the data. This is the “unobservable index” that we want to construct of welfare (or in this case: health
vulnerability). The principal components are new variables created as linear combinations (weighted sums)
of the original variables. The weights are generated as linear combinations of the co-variance structure of
the variables and have a finite variance (for each set of weights the sum of the squares is constrained to be
one). Redundancy or interdependence of the indicators is not considered to be a problem in this method.
Rather, it is seen as an advantage: the optimization process links the data sub-sets and increases the number
of constraints on the algorithm to converge to a “true composite measure”. Limitations of this approach are
of course in the assumptions. The method assumes that the main source of variability in the data is indeed
related to differences in welfare dimensions (i.e. the chosen health factors) and not, for instance by different
preferences and factors other than those taken into account. Further, outcomes are sensitive to the initial
choice and grouping of the data. We do not see this as a major problem in this case as we depart from a
sub-set of indicators of which we think a priori that they determine health conditions simultaneously.
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mortality and in the prevalence of infectious diseases during El Niño of 1982-3 (see
Velasco and others 1998). Hence we applied the instrument also to the 1990 population
census data, the most recent data set to repeat the analysis at the level of cantons, to
obtain the closest possible identification of health vulnerability to El Niño of 1997-8.
Table A.2 gives the results. It shows that the ten cantons with the highest vulnerability
include Eloy Alfaro, Muisne and San Lorenzo in the province of Esmeraldas, Palenque
and Baba in Los Ríos, Colimes, Pedro Carbo, Palestina and Urbina Jado in Guayas and
Flavio Alfaro and Paján in Manabí.
The ICSS helps to provide a first indication of vulnerability and the
(geographical) targeting of health interventions may start with a ranking of municipalities
by their score on the index. Clearly to decide on priority policy actions a more complete
health sector analysis would be required on the causes of mortality and morbidity and the
cost-effectiveness of both preventive and curative health interventions. Such diagnoses
are hard to come by in Ecuador.  Nevertheless, to take the analysis one step further, we
apply a factor analysis to identify the factors that seem most associated with improving
(or compensating for) the social and sanitary conditions of the population (through the
ICSS) including overall economic conditions (proxied by the poverty index), education
and availability of health services. The factor analysis further considers a number of
known facts about the consequences of El Niño of 1997-8, including:10
• Direct effects on the population, distinguishing: (i) increase in disease prevalence
(cholera, dengue fever and malaria);  (ii) number of deaths, wounded, and evacuated
population; (iii) children that could not assist school due to damages to education
infrastructure; (iv) damage to houses; and (v) damage to sanitation systems.
• Impact on health services (hospitals and health centers): (vi) number of health units
that suffered damages and (vii) health units requiring additional investment in
equipment, medication and personnel.
• Damages to road infrastructure: (viii) damages to main roads (in kilometers) and (ix)
number of bridges that have collapsed due to El Niño.
                                                
10 We apply a fixed-effects design factor analysis. The factor analysis examines the effect of several
independent variables (the mentioned indicators of the impact of El Niño) on a dependent variable (the
ICSS index, i.e. the vulnerability to health risks).
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We use this method to come to a typology of required policy interventions at the
provincial and the level of cantons. Table 7 lists some of the indicators measuring the
impact of El Niño by provinces. Table A.2 gives additional data by municipalities
(cantons).
 Table 7
 Situation variables that form part of typology by provinces
 PROVINCIAS  EL ORO  ESMERALDAS  GUAYAS  MANABI  LOS RIOS
 Affected health centers  7  6  17  8  6
 Damaged and destroyed
houses
 2,305  1,125  1,623  4,337  805
 Cases of malaria  298  1,578  2,077  160  95
 Cases of cholera  44  170  1  26  0
 Cases of dengue fever  205  713  77  1,049  110
 Affected sanitation systems  3  2  3  3  1
 Damaged roads and bridges  5  16  19  14  7
 Source: Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998), based on: SIISE (STFS 1998) and Ministry of Public
Works (May 1998).
At the level of provinces we get to the following typology (Table 8):
• Type 1: impact on persons and infrastructure. Areas (provinces) that require priority
action to mitigate health impact (prevention of spread of malaria, cholera, dengue and
leptospirosis) and restore and construct both sanitation infrastructure (health centers,
sewerage and drinking water systems) as well as roads and bridges.
• Type 2: impact on persons. Priority action is to mitigate risk of infectious diseases
via vaccination programs and other preventive health care.
• Type 3: impact on infrastructure. Areas that require priority action in rehabilitating
sanitary infrastructure as well as roads.
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 Table 8
 Typology of Affected Provinces in the Costa
 TYPES
 
 
 PROVINCES
 1
 Priority action towards
affected persons and
sanitation infrastructure
 2
 Priority action
towards preventive
health care
 3
 Priority action
towards sanitary and
road infrastructure
 El Oro   X  
 Esmeraldas  X   
 Manabí  X   
 Guayas1  (X)   X
 Los Ríos1  (X)   X
 Source: Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998), based on: SIISE (STFS 1998) and Ministry of Public 
Works (May 1998).
 Note: 1. Priorities at provincial level biased by situation in main cities. Areas outside main cities fall 
under Type 1. See text.
 
For the targeting of interventions at the municipal level we combine the factors
determining the degree of vulnerability to health risks and the degree of damages to
health infrastructure by El Niño. This leads to four types of cantons (see Tables 9 and
A.3):
• Type A: low vulnerability and low impact. These cantons show relatively good socio-
economic conditions and access to health services. Moreover the measured impact of
El Niño has been small, hence requiring low priority in policy action. Example:
Marcelino Maridueña in the province of Guayas.
• Type B: moderate vulnerability, but relatively strong impact of El Niño (in terms of
damaged housing, size of evacuated population and increased prevalence of
infectious diseases). These may require relatively high priority of temporary support
to reestablish homes, etc., but a lower priority in investments in sanitary
infrastructure. Example: Santa Rosa in El Oro.
• Type C: high vulnerability, but moderate impact of El Niño. Emphasis in these cases
should be on medium run investment in sanitary infrastructure and improvement in
socio-economic conditions in general. Example: Chone in Manabí.
• Type D: high vulnerability and strong impact of El Niño. These are the poorest areas
that also suffered the heaviest impact of El Niño, requiring both short-term
emergency assistance and substantial investment in preventive and curative health to
reduce vulnerability to health risks. Example: Baba in Los Ríos.
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 Table  9
 Typology of cantons (municipalities) affected by El Niño. Case studies.
 TYPE
 
 Canton (Province)
 A
 Marcelino
 Maridueña
 (Guayas)
 B
 Santa Rosa
 
 (El Oro)
 C
 Chone
 
 (Manabí)
 D
 Baba
 
 (Los Ríos)
 Poverty incidence (%)  23%  41%  60%  75%
 Functional illiteracy (% of
population > 15 years)
 15%  18%  35%  46%
 Medical personnel (x 10.000
inhabitants)
 64  21.6  17  9.5
 Deaths due to El Niño  1  25  7  3
 Wounded due to El Niño  0  38  -  0
 Damaged and destroyed houses  16 (1%)  1,838 (18%)  292 (1%)  60 (1%)
 Total dwellings in canton  1,633  10,096  20,634  5,682
 Pupils unable to assist school due
to El Niño
 0  7,836  436  1,840
 Severely affected population  0  1,106 (2%)  112 (0.1%)  269 (0.8%)
 Evacuated population  0  2,194 (4%)  87 (0.6%)  206 (0.6%)
 Total population  9,557  60,060  136,564  34,725
      Sources:Tables A.2 and A.3, based on Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998) and SIISE (STFS 1998)
and Defensa Civil (May 1998).
 
We interpret priority action at two instances. First, emergency assistance needed
in the short run to mitigate the impact of El Niño through health assistance and repair of
damages to infrastructure. Second, over the medium run, actions should have dealt with
improvement in the coverage and quality of the preventive and curative health
infrastructure, such that it helps to reduce the vulnerability of health risks and hence
provide better protection against future appearances of El Niño and to improve health
conditions in general. The analysis of the existing situation leads us to conclude that:
• Esmeraldas and Manabí are the most affected provinces. The population in these
areas needs almost universal action to improve sanitation infrastructure, repair of
health centers and rehabilitation of roads and bridges. Most cantons in these
provinces show high vulnerability and high impact of El Niño (type D). On average
Esmeraldas shows the highest vulnerability to health risks (poorest social and sanitary
conditions), but Manabí suffered a much larger impact of El Niño as measured by the
prevalence of infectious diseases, deaths and evacuated population. While emergency
assistance and improvement of sanitation infrastructure are required in both
provinces, Manabí would initially require more emphasis on the former and
Esmeraldas on the latter.
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• Los Ríos and Guayas have suffered heavy damages to sanitary and road
infrastructure. Hence the policy priority is Type 3 (see Table 8). However, this
outcome is biased due to the situation in the larger cities (Guayaquil, Durán, Salinas,
Milagro, Babahoyo, and Quevedo). Most other municipalities in these two provinces
show high vulnerability to health risks and have been substantially affected by El
Niño (Type D; Table A.3), hence where Type 1 interventions should be emphasized.
• El Oro has a relatively better social and sanitary conditions, but did show some
increase in cases of malaria, dengue and cholera during 1998 as compared to 1997,
hence policy should give priority to preventive health care (Type 2). However, in
some cantons a broader range of interventions (Type 1) needs to be targeted (such as
in Guabo; see Table A.2).
Preventive health policies prior and during El Niño of 1998 lacked a guide of this
sort. The Ministry of Public Health did establish a contingency action plan, though, ahead
of the occurrence of El Niño and mobilized a budget from unused project funds (to a total
of US$ 8 million) to finance activities. Most of this budget could be executed (88% by
May 1998) on the repair of damaged health centers and sanitation systems, purchase and
distribution of medicines in the affected areas, health education campaigns and actions to
combat the outbreak of malaria. Prior to the contingency plan the Ministry had already, as
indicated, launched a campaign of immunizations of children under five years of age and
also provided health centers with additional supplies of medicines to cure infectious
diseases (MSP 1997). Resources to prevent the outbreak and combat malaria proved
insufficient though (Velasco and others 1998). By the end of El Niño (May/June 1998),
the Ministry had shifted emphasis to the rehabilitation of damaged drinking water
systems as preventive action to contain parasitic diseases.
Despite these efforts, actions in public health have been largely reactive to the
threat of El Niño. Few lessons were drawn from the experience with El Niño of 1982-3.
Preventive measures, such as investment in flood-resistant sanitation systems and
permanent vaccination campaigns in the vulnerable areas, were not implemented beyond
some isolated cases. One such exception is Babahoyo in Los Ríos where – with external
funding – improved sanitation system and related infrastructure was built after El Niño of
1982-3. The project took seven years to complete and cost US$ 300 per beneficiary. The
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outcome though was that there were no more problems of flooding, neither during the
normal rainy seasons nor during the El Niño event of 1997-8, and there was a strong
reduction in the prevalence of infectious diseases. Not many other positive examples of
this sort can be built on. During the most recent episode of El Niño the Ministry of Public
Health has not worked with a systematic methodology of vulnerability to health risks
which could both serve as a tool for an early warning system and to set priorities in
preventive and curative action. At the ending of the climatic effects of El Niño 1997-8,
the Ministry is essentially responding to demands it receives from provincial health
departments without having tools to prioritize allocation of resources and actions in
function of needs and deficiencies in health services.
5. ACTION FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION: HOW
MUCH HAS HAPPENED?
The phenomenon of El Niño of 1997-8 was a pre-announced disaster. The
Ecuadorian authorities declared a state of emergency on July 2, 1997 and formulated a
contingency plan prior to the disaster. In November 1997, when El Niño had given its
first signs of presence, a total budget of US$ 333 million had been put together for
emergency relief, preventive action and humanitarian aid (Table 10). The World Bank,
IDB and CAF provided most of the funding (US$ 208 million) in the form of loans. The
contingency plan proved useful in preparing the population for the event. In October
1997 a special coordination unit (COPEFEN) was created to implement the contingency
plan and coordinate actions towards prevention, emergency relief and repair of damages
to be undertaken by a wide range of public entities.
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Table 10
Available Financing for Emergency Aid and Rehabilitation of Damages caused by
El Niño, 1997-8
 (August 1998)
(millions of US$)
Total amount
Government Resources
   Funds reserved by central government (569 rehabilitation projects)
   Emergency assistance of military
   Counterpart Funds for Foreign Loans received for El Niño
67.2
41.0
5.2
21.0
International Humanitarian Aid
   Humanitarian aid of governments and government agencies
   Humanitarian aid of NGO’s and private donations
   Cooperation of international organizations
   Transport costs for international humanitarian aid
35.8
23.4
9.5
0.8
2.1
Foreign Loans for El Niño
   World Bank (reallocation of existing social sector loans)
   World Bank (new loans)
   Inter-American Development Bank (reallocation of existing social sector loans)
   Inter-American Development Bank (new loans)
   Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)
   United States (PL 480 for reactivation of agriculture)
215.0
20.0
60.0
34.2
70.8
25.0
5.0
Total 318.0
Source:  CEPAL (1998: p. 14); COPEFEN (1998).
Despite these preparations, a main conclusion of this study is that the authorities
were poorly prepared to counteract the main effects of the disaster and, in particular,
protect the more vulnerable groups of the population. This is apparent from the
following:
• The Defensa Civil had prepared itself to provide emergency humanitarian aid, but did
not manage to establish effective coordination with local governments and
communities. In effect, in the course of events the army had to be called in to
overcome problems of transportation and logistics.
• The COPEFEN proved little effective and its director was accused of fraud in
February 1998 and was replaced. Over 90% of the government budget for emergency
aid (US$ 41 million) was transferred to provincial authorities, but only 55% could be
justified with proper accounts (COPEFEN 1998: 3).
• It took until April 1998 before COPEFEN managed to improve its operative capacity
and was placed under political responsibility of the Vice-President of the Republic.
World Bank and IDB condition their funding to the establishment of a Technical
Committee with representatives of provincial authorities and a committee with
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broader participation of civil society. In August COPEFEN reports that the inputs of
the Provincial Technical Committee have been little useful to plan activities and
allocate resources, while the civil society committee could never be formed
(COPEFEN 1998: 8).
• The Contingency Plan identified 105 potentially affected cantons with a total
population of 6.5 million, more than half of the Ecuadorian population (see Table 2).
These cantons were classified by climatic risk (Table 1), but this classification proved
little useful to target actions of prevention and rehabilitation. The authorities lacked
methodologies as proposed here to distinguish between types of risk and vulnerability
of different areas and population groups, which could guide targeted action towards
preventive action and post-disaster support in health, improvement of sanitary
infrastructure and coverage of risk of agricultural production losses.
As a consequence, the authorities lacked a clear and systematic idea of how to
allocate available resources for emergency relief and reconstruction to the affected and
needed areas. By January 1998 only 15% of IDB resources and 10% of World Bank
funds were disbursed for specified actions. No earlier than July 1998 more substantial
progress was made to find a destination for the available resources. By August 1998 73%
of the international support was allocated to projects of rehabilitation and reconstruction.
However, by then only 19% of the resources had effectively been disbursed for concrete
action (see Table 11).
The allocation of resources by COPEFEN is guided by (i) the estimation of
damages by sector as estimated by CEPAL (1998) and (ii) advise from the Provincial
Technical Committee (COPEFEN 1998). One may have doubts about the effectiveness of
the process. The CEPAL report seems to overestimate the economic damages, but more
importantly only specifies costs by sector but does not provide a basis to differentiate
risks and needs by population groups. Hence it may prove to be a poor guide for the
targeting of actions to vulnerable population groups and areas. Further, COPEFEN itself
is doubtful about the functioning of the Provincial Technical Committee (COPEFEN
1998).
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Table 11
Execution status of foreign assistance for rehabilitation projects
El Niño, 1997-8 (until August 1998)
(values in millions of dollars)
External Finance Committed and disbursed by COPEFEN
1 2 (2)/(1) 3 (3)/(1) 4 (4)/(1)
Loan
commitments
Disbursements % Committed % Disbursed by
COPEFEN
%
IDB 105.0 45.4 43% 82.1 78%
World Bank 80.0 9.9 12% 56.7 71%
CAF 25.0 22.8 91% 25.0 100%
Counterpart funds 21.0 .. .. 4.0 19%
Total 231.0 78.1 34% 167.8 73% 45.0 19%
Source: COPEFEN (1998)
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
El Niño of 1997-8 has caused substantial damages in Ecuador and has cost the
lives of at least 286 human beings. This study estimates the (direct) economic costs of the
damages at US$ 534 million or 2.7% of GDP. The most affected population groups have
been the poorer self-employed farmers and agricultural workers who suffered production
and employment losses. We estimate poverty in the affected rural areas may have
increased by as much as ten percentage points in 1998. In the social area, increased health
risks form the most important danger presented by El Niño. There has been a spread of
contagious diseases such as malaria, cholera and dengue. During 1998 no information
was available to measure the direct health impact, but based on risk factors we estimate
that some 2.5 million Ecuadorians in the coastal regions are most vulnerable to diseases
and worsening of health conditions caused by El Niño.
The more vulnerable population to the effects of El Niño typically has lower
initial incomes, lower educational levels, and less access to economic and social
infrastructure. The vulnerability is enhanced by poor quality of available infrastructure.
In this sense, the consequences of El Niño are in the first place a problem of development
than an obstacle to development.
How to respond to natural disasters like El Niño? What objectives would
precisely be pursued in disaster relief actions? During and immediately after the disaster
there is the need for emergency action to save lives, evacuate people from flooded areas
and provide them with shelter and food, health interventions to prevent outbreak of
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epidemics, and so on. After the event, what can and should be done to compensate those
that suffered most and what by way of preventive action in case of future occurrences? In
the case of El Niño we know it is a recurring event, even though there will always remain
uncertainty as how, when and where exactly it will leave a trace of disaster.
How to compensate for losses and what preventive action? These policy questions
refer back to the methodological issues raised in Section 2 regarding how to assess the
costs of a natural disaster and will have to be framed with a clear view of the objectives
that are to be achieved. Finally, given the recurring nature of El Niño, the question could
be raised whether insurance schemes could be implemented to protect families and
workers from the costs they may suffer in future events.
On insurance schemes we may be brief in the case of Ecuador. Firstly, Ecuador’s
insurance and financial markets are highly underdeveloped and imperfect. Only a fraction
of the population has car or home insurance policies, while income risk insurance is non-
existent. Second, also in contexts with more developed insurance markets, the risks of
natural disasters prove difficult to insure (cf. the risk of hurricanes in the Caribbean and
U.S. states like Florida). Moreover, the U.S. experience shows that even when there is
some kind of insurance, the pressure on governments to declare a state of emergency is
heavy and insurance companies are able to off load costs on tax payers. In all, it is
difficult to visualize a private insurance scheme, which would provide protection to the
rural poor in Ecuador’s coastal areas who we have identified as the most vulnerable to the
effects of El Niño.
The more pressing strategic policy question would be whether to concentrate on
disaster relief (beyond emergency assistance) or development investment. How much
should one spend on repair and rehabilitation (of roads, houses and agricultural lands) to
bring disaster areas back into their state prior to the disaster, or should one focus on
reconstructive investment oriented at reducing vulnerability and enhancing development
in general? In the latter case, relocation of population out of vulnerable areas and
reorientation of economic activities are options to be considered. Time and cost
dimensions will be important here: development investment takes time and resources
may be limited to meet structural needs in all affected areas.
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Here we will suggest a policy approach that considers both: compensatory relief
and developmental investment, but emphasizes the latter.
The policy recommendations that can be derived from this study are the following:11
Targeting and monitoring instruments:
• Policy actions should be targeted towards the more vulnerable and most affected
population groups. Comparison of the 1982-3 and 1997-8 experience shows that El
Niño, with a few exceptions, tends to affect the same geographical areas and that
besides damages to infrastructure, agricultural income losses and increased health
risks affect living conditions most. For the targeting, the methodologies applied in
this study to identify vulnerable agricultural zones and classify the population by
social and sanitary risks to health may provide useful starting points, both to elaborate
more effective contingencies plans for future events and to target investments in
response to the 1997-8 event.
Possible measures towards agriculture and rural development in the affected areas:
• A pure income transfer program to compensate poor farmers and agricultural workers
for production and employment losses does not seem to be the best policy. What
should be the size of the transfer? If compensated for the foregone earnings as
estimated in this study, a perfectly targeted transfer scheme would require a total fund
of US$ 130 million. However, as we have seen, a great majority (over 70%) of the
population in the affected areas was poor prior to the El Niño and would remain poor
after the indicated transfer. During the event it would have made sense to target food
aid or direct income transfers to the most vulnerable population using the
methodology proposed in Section 3 as a means of immediate assistance. This would
be a recommendation to consider for a future event rather than as a meaningful action
long after El Niño,12 but also in that case such a scheme should typically be of a
                                                
11 See Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998) for a further elaboration of these recommendations.
12 The Ecuadorian government did proceed with allowing for greater imports of basic food items such as
rice and sugar. This helped to contain food inflation and limited the spillover effects of El Niño on incomes
of the urban population, but was untargeted and hence did little to compensate the affected rural poor.
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short-term nature and last until agricultural production and rural employment have
returned to ‘normal’ levels.
• After the event it seems to make sense to focus in the short run on a reactivation of
agricultural production. We believe this makes sense for the following reasons. First,
most agricultural production in the vulnerable areas is viable, albeit in need of
productivity improvements and improvements in rural infrastructure.  Second,
relocation of some farmers to less vulnerable areas seems needed in a few specific
areas (in particular, the shores in the delta of the Guayas River), but not viable for the
larger affected population as the land frontier in Ecuador has been reached. Third,
much of the lost employment will be regained as soon as agricultural production is
rehabilitated. In the present context possible funds for an income transfer scheme
might be best used to provide affected small-scale farmers with affordable credits to
rehabilitate their land and prepare for a new harvest. The credit may contain a subsidy
to compensate for the income losses (foregone savings) in the period of lost harvest
due to El Niño. Fourth, employment is likely to increase in the short run if
simultaneously a start is made with the repair of rural infrastructure (rural roads,
bridges, irrigation systems).
• Medium-term measures should equally focus on improved credit schemes for small-
scale farmers and improving rural infrastructure. As to the latter, this would involve
continuing and finalizing investment projects towards improved water control and
irrigation in the areas permanently vulnerable to flooding, in particular the area
surrounding the delta of the river Guayas. Many such projects started in the early
1980s but were halted. The network of tertiary roads should be improved in the
affected areas and made accessible for year-round transportation. Other medium-
term, preventive action in rural areas should equally relate to improving agricultural
productivity and employment opportunities, including technical assistance promoting
greater diversification of production to crops with a short cycle and higher
profitability (such as soya, mango and other) and improvement of distribution
networks, storage systems, and packaging of products. All these measures should be
expected to contribute to reducing the vulnerability to production losses due to
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disasters such as El Niño, but also to those normally incurred during the regular rainy
season.
• Rural poverty is closely associated with the unequal land distribution (World Bank
1996 and Jácome, Larrea and Vos 1998). Thus if the policy objective is to
simultaneously achieve reduction in vulnerability to weather shocks and raise overall
living conditions in the rural areas of the Ecuador’s Costa region, then land reform
policies should be considered as a part of the medium-term measures.
Health policies:
• In the health sector immediate action is required to eradicate malaria, cholera and
dengue fever.13 Critical for preventive action to reduce health vulnerability is the
improvement of sanitary infrastructure resistant to the types of problems posed during
the regular rainy season and exacerbated during episodes of El Niño. The ICSS may
serve as a guide to target the investments in sanitary infrastructure. With reference to
a successful project in Babahoyo, the unit costs of such a durable solution could be in
the order of magnitude of US$ 300 per beneficiary. The back-of-the-envelop
calculation for the severely vulnerable population in the provinces of the Costa would
imply a total required budget of US$ 750 million, that is 0.5% of GDP if spread out
over a period of seven years. Further cost-effectiveness analysis of this option may be
needed before projecting it on the entire population, but the indications are that this
could be in the range of a set of feasible policy solutions. Such investment in sanitary
infrastructure should be supplemented by a permanent campaign of immunizations
aiming at coverage of 100% (rather than that this should be developed as emergency
action in the wake of the weather shock).
The findings and, hence, policy recommendations of this study depend to a
considerable extent depend on an analysis of the probability of being affected by El Niño
through the study of risk factors and identification of vulnerable areas and population
                                                
13 The Ministry of Health did start a promising novel anti-malaria campaign in the post-El Niño period.
Once reemerged, the prevalence of malaria can stay high for years after. The new campaign involves
secondary school students who are trained to act as health agents to detect, prevent and monitor malaria
cases.
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groups. Ecuador lacks adequate and timely monitoring systems to capture the actual
impact on incomes and health status during and shortly after the main symptoms of the
disaster have disappeared. Hence a complete evaluation of the full impact of the disaster
yet has to be made. It is important this is done. The main study produced on the effects of
El Niño of 1982-3 was a report by CEPAL (1983), which was produced in February 1983
when the natural phenomenon was still in full effect. No serious ex-post evaluation was
produced and the country probably will again be ill prepared for the next return of El
Niño if this again is omitted for the 1997-8 event.
Such a study could also test the adequacy of vulnerability analysis applied in the
present study as a tool for preventive action in face of expected new natural disasters.
More importantly, it may guide the required priority setting and targeting in overall
development policies in agriculture, health and infrastructure in Ecuador’s vulnerable
coastal region.
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Table A.1:
Affected cantons (municipalities) most vulnerable to agricultural income losses
(ranking by level of poverty incidence)
Province Canton Poverty
before El
Niño
Total rural
population
Poor rural
population
No. of
Agricultural
zone
Main crops (by share of
cultivated area)
Main affected
socio-economic
group
 MANABI Bolívar 80.4% 29,445 23,685 24 Cocoa (32%), Coffee
(14%)
Farmer-owner
 LOS RIOS Vinces 80.3% 42,472 34,125 32 Rice (17%), Corn (5%) Farmer-owner
ESMERALDAS
Quinindé 79.6% 65,793 52,362 28 Corn (43,2%), Banana
(14,5%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 LOS RIOS Palenque 79.4% 21,099 16,751 32 Rice, Corn (22%) Farmer-owner
 MANABI Chone 78.4% 85,830 67,311 7,27 Rice (46%), Cotton (43%) Farmer-owner
 MANABI Santa Ana 78.2% 49,838 38,972 20 Corn (62%), Cotton (19%) Farmer-owner
ESMERALDAS
Esmeraldas 77.7% 51,585 40,095 25 Corn (52%) Farmer-owner
 MANABI Jipijapa 77.6% 41,709 32,378 21 Corn (60%), Peanuts (15%) Farmer-owner
 CAÑAR La Trocal 77.0% 11,346 8,733 1 Rice (49%), Livestock
(20%)
Farmer-owner
 GUAYAS Palestina 76.6% 6,804 5,213 6 Rice (65%), Livestock
(22%)
Farmer-owner
 LOS RIOS Quevedo 76.6% 64,932 49,736 29 Coffee, Cocoa (35%),
Corn, Soya, Rice
Farmer-owner
 MANABI Tosagua 76.2% 28,182 21,469 23 Livestock (30%), Corn
(17%)
Farmer-owner
 MANABI Sucre 76.2% 43,631 33,227 7 Rice (46%), Cotton (43%) Farmer-owner
 MANABI Rocafuerte 76.0% 19,867 15,100 18 Rice (31%), Corn (22%) Farmer-owner
 GUAYAS Samboron-
dón
75.8% 19,077 14,451 8 Rice (16%), Other (84%) Farmer-owner
 GUAYAS Urbina Jado 75.6% 42,338 32,008 9 Rice (44%), Other (56%) Farmer-owner
 MANABI 24 de Mayo 75.5% 39,354 29,732 21 Corn (60%), Peanuts (15%) Farmer-owner
 LOS RIOS Ventanas 74.8% 40,801 30,530 30 Cocoa (25%), Coffee
(18%)
Farmer-owner
 LOS RIOS Baba 74.7% 34,011 25,403 33 Rice, Corn (70%), Sugar
cane (10%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 LOS RIOS Babahoyo 74.7% 56,372 42,104 33 Rice, Corn (70%), Sugar
cane (10%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 MANABI Junín 72.7% 20,809 15,131 7 Rice (46%), Cotton (43%) Farmer-owner
ESMERALDAS
Eloy Alfaro 72.3% 29,365 21,239 26 Cocoa (18%), Livestock
(10%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 GUAYAS Alfredo
Baquerizo
72.2% 11,883 8,576 33 Rice, Corn (70%), Sugar
cane (10%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
ESMERALDAS
Muisne 70.0% 26,066 18,258 27 Banana (14,5%), Coffee
(14,9%)
Agricultural
worker, Farmer-
owner
 GUAYAS Naranjito 69.0% 7,558 5,217 3/4 Sugar cane (85%) Agricultural worker
 EL ORO Arenillas 68.1% 7,782 5,296 14 Livestock (60%) Agricultural worker
 MANABI Portoviejo 67.0% 72,425 48,556 7 Rice (46%), Cotton (43%) Farmer-owner
 GUAYAS Durán 66.5% 3,281 2,183 1 y 5 Rice, Banana Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 GUAYAS Santa Lucía 66.3% 24,071 15,966 6 Rice (65%), Livestock
(22%)
Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 GUAYAS El Triunfo 65.0% 9,222 5,995 3/4 Sugar cane (85%) Agricultural worker
 LOS RIOS Puebloviejo 65.0% 26,211 17,024 32 Rice, Corn Farmer-owner
 GUAYAS Yaguachi 64.3% 26,692 17,165 10 Rice Farmer-owner
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Province Canton Poverty
before El
Niño
Total rural
population
Poor rural
population
No. of
Agricultural
zone
Main crops (by share of
cultivated area)
Main affected
socio-economic
group
 GUAYAS Naranjal 61.6% 27,143 16,724 1 y 5 Rice, Banana Farmer-owner,
Agricultural worker
 EL ORO El Guabo 61.5% 19,610 12,063 11/12/13 Banana (60%), Coffee,
Cocoa (20%)
Agricultural
worker, Farmer-
owner
 EL ORO Pasaje 58.9% 19,150 11,289 11/12/13 Banana (60%), Coffee,
Cocoa (20%)
Agricultural
worker, Farmer-
owner
 GUAYAS Milagro 58.1% 26,324 15,284 2 Sugar cane (27%), Banana
(15%)
Agricultural worker
 EL ORO Santa Rosa 53.2% 16,739 8,907 14 Livestock (60%) Agricultural worker
 EL ORO Machala 49.6% 15,510 7,687 11/12/13 Banana (60%), Coffee,
Cocoa (20%)
Agricultural
worker, Farmer-
owner
 EL ORO Huaquillas 29.8% 201 60 16 Livestock (60%) Agricultural worker
Total (listed) affected cantons 73.1% 1,184,526 866,006
Source:  SIISE; Ministry of Agriculture (MAG); own fieldwork.
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Table A.2
Vulnerability to Health Risks of Affected Cantons in the Costa1
Province Canton Ranking
by ICSS
ICSS Functional
illiteracy
rate (%)
Populatio
n with
access to
drinking
water (%)
Population
with access
to sewerage
(%)
Population
not affected
by
overcrowde
d housing
(%)
Prevalence of
chronic
malnutrition
(%)
Population1
990
Population
1997
ESMERALDAS Eloy Alfaro 1 19.3 53.0% 6.5% 2.2% 68.7% 45.2 2,736 29,365
GUAYAS Colimes 2 25.2 49.0% 8.9% 2.3% 66.4% 44.0 13,475 22,244
LOS RIOS Palenque 3 25.5 52.6% 6.3% 4.0% 69.4% 43.5 13,117 21,099
ESMERALDAS Muisne 4 25.6 51.2% 12.3% 10.0% 67.8% 45.5 3,086 26,066
LOS RIOS Baba 5 26.5 46.2% 7.1% 4.3% 72.8% 42.9 8,761 34,011
GUAYAS Pedro Carbo 6 27.8 45.5% 0.7% 0.4% 59.5% 44.8 16,075 36,581
GUAYAS Palestina 7 29.7 47.1% 14.0% 5.7% 64.8% 43.9 5,610 12,943
GUAYAS Urbina Jado 8 29.9 38.2% 7.0% 0.9% 64.9% 42.5 13,166 50,673
MANABI Flavio Alfaro 9 30.7 44.4% 10.3% 1.6% 86.5% 42.9 17,509 27,311
ESMERALDAS San Lorenzo 10 32.3 44.7% 16.8% 15.6% 69.3% 44.0 6,136 26,083
MANABI Paján 11 32.4 50.4% 9.8% 7.5% 65.1% 43.8 7,815 49,093
EL ORO Las Ladies 12 32.6 29.9% 8.1% 5.5% 73.4% 43.0 1,106 5,628
EL ORO Chill 13 33.2 40.3% 12.2% 12.0% 84.7% 42.9 1,420 3,200
ESMERALDAS Quinindé 14 33.5 43.0% 13.8% 14.3% 72.0% 42.6 15,026 87,360
GUAYAS Santa Lucía 15 34.0 44.6% 11.4% 2.8% 61.4% 43.3 18,853 31,624
LOS RIOS Montalvo 16 37.0 34.1% 4.1% 0.7% 83.0% 40.2 10,113 22,002
MANABI Pichincha 17 38.3 50.5% 7.9% 3.0% 75.7% 44.1 8,861 33,341
GUAYAS Santa Elena 18 38.4 27.0% 5.5% 1.8% 68.0% 41.4 15,799 97,165
GUAYAS Daule 19 39.8 37.0% 20.3% 8.9% 67.3% 41.8 13,915 82,231
LOS RIOS Vinces 20 40.3 36.9% 18.8% 17.0% 71.8% 40.3 18,616 62,727
GUAYAS Balao 21 40.5 35.4% 22.3% 5.0% 73.7% 43.3 6,460 14,474
GUAYAS El Triunfo 22 42.3 30.0% 1.7% 2.1% 75.8% 41.5 13,759 29,243
GUAYAS Balzar 23 44.0 42.6% 23.4% 22.8% 67.9% 42.2 22,572 52,145
GUAYAS El Empalme 24 44.1 37.7% 17.6% 7.1% 77.4% 42.0 19,759 46,226
GUAYAS Playas 25 44.3 25.6% 3.0% 1.9% 78.5% 41.0 13,925 24,855
MANABI Junín 26 45.2 38.5% 13.9% 11.2% 89.0% 40.4 11,917 20,809
GUAYAS Samborondón 27 45.6 32.3% 30.9% 18.9% 74.7% 39.8 15,623 39,284
MANABI Sucre 28 45.7 41.2% 16.9% 10.7% 79.5% 41.9 11,404 87,162
LOS RIOS Puebloviejo 29 46.6 39.0% 21.7% 9.4% 72.1% 41.4 6,693 26,211
GUAYAS Salinas 30 46.7 21.0% 2.1% 1.6% 75.5% 40.1 38,389 37,513
GUAYAS Alfredo
Baquerizo
31 46.7 38.1% 19.3% 7.7% 75.4% 40.8 9,469 18,798
MANABI Montecristi 32 47.4 41.9% 19.6% 7.5% 73.2% 42.8 14,793 43,557
MANABI Jipijapa 33 48.5 39.6% 22.3% 17.5% 68.9% 41.3 16,811 80,010
MANABI Santa Ana 34 48.9 48.7% 9.3% 1.5% 82.0% 43.1 9,612 57,203
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Province Canton Ranking
by ICSS
ICSS Functional
illiteracy
rate (%)
Populatio
n with
access to
drinking
water (%)
Population
with access
to sewerage
(%)
Population
not affected
by
overcrowde
d housing
(%)
Prevalence of
chronic
malnutrition
(%)
Population1
990
Population
1997
MANABI Tosagua 35 49.2 38.4% 17.1% 2.3% 77.3% 40.7 10,752 36,754
MANABI 24 de Mayo 36 49.8 49.4% 8.2% 1.8% 81.0% 43.4 9,605 39,354
LOS RIOS Babahoyo 37 49.9 28.3% 23.4% 23.9% 76.9% 37.0 29,887 121,987
MANABI El Carmen 38 50.0 36.0% 22.1% 6.6% 83.8% 41.0 22,469 62,537
MANABI Rocafuerte 39 50.5 32.5% 14.6% 5.0% 80.1% 38.5 15,826 30,096
LOS RIOS Urdaneta 40 50.5 37.6% 24.4% 22.3% 78.7% 40.9 13,493 27,132
LOS RIOS Ventanas 41 52.1 33.2% 21.5% 17.7% 75.4% 41.1 17,326 67,654
GUAYAS Naranjal 42 52.8 32.3% 30.0% 22.2% 75.7% 41.2 8,680 45,646
GUAYAS Yaguachi 43 52.9 29.2% 29.0% 19.2% 80.0% 40.0 9,878 45,481
LOS RIOS Quevedo 44 54.1 30.7% 25.6% 17.8% 79.5% 39.4 53,809 195,809
MANABI Chone 45 54.8 36.1% 31.4% 22.4% 84.6% 38.7 22,643 133,755
ESMERALDAS Esmeraldas 46 54.9 26.9% 28.5% 32.0% 75.9% 38.0 58,801 200,634
EL ORO El Guabo 47 55.8 23.7% 27.5% 16.6% 76.6% 40.6 7,433 32,452
EL ORO Zaruma 48 56.2 28.0% 37.9% 35.9% 85.0% 38.1 4,154 27,410
GUAYAS Naranjito 49 57.7 31.1% 29.8% 20.8% 81.8% 40.8 13,393 27,360
MANABI Bolívar 50 57.8 38.4% 22.9% 20.1% 84.7% 40.2 13,194 43,465
EL ORO Arenillas 51 59.8 20.6% 34.1% 35.4% 78.9% 38.0 7,687 21,182
EL ORO Piñas 52 61.1 22.6% 42.6% 40.1% 90.4% 35.5 5,856 25,263
EL ORO Marcabelí 53 62.1 24.5% 43.2% 32.2% 83.7% 39.9 2,191 5,655
EL ORO Atahualpa 54 63.6 21.0% 37.1% 27.0% 94.8% 38.4 1,142 7,095
EL ORO Portovelo 55 63.9 21.1% 39.4% 48.9% 85.5% 37.1 3,751 11,863
EL ORO Balsas 56 65.1 18.7% 43.6% 40.1% 83.6% 37.4 2,040 4,703
EL ORO Huaquillas 57 69.5 18.9% 41.0% 7.8% 78.7% 39.1 26,944 32,160
GUAYAS Durán 58 71.0 14.6% 34.1% 41.8% 84.0% 32.3 79,711 98,537
EL ORO Santa Rosa 59 71.4 18.3% 46.4% 53.0% 80.8% 36.1 22,463 58,824
GUAYAS Milagro 60 72.2 20.7% 47.7% 27.7% 83.5% 35.8 72,807 134,624
MANABI Portoviejo 61 73.0 25.1% 49.4% 45.1% 84.2% 34.2 91,715 233,761
EL ORO Pasaje 62 73.3 19.4% 50.2% 46.0% 82.5% 36.0 22,256 59,456
EL ORO Machala 63 75.2 12.8% 38.8% 50.8% 82.4% 33.8 132,474 182,287
MANABI Manta 64 76.0 25.4% 55.7% 49.4% 83.6% 36.1 118,802 153,614
GUAYAS Guayaquil 65 79.4 11.9% 46.4% 53.3% 81.3% 2.2 1,449,306 1,816,307
Source: Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998) based on Secretaría Técnica del Frente Social, SIISE (1998); INEC, Population Census 1982, 1990.
Note:     1. Only includes cantons  established in1990 or earlier. New cantons created after 1990 are excluded for lack of complete data.
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Table A.3
Typology of 105 (potentially) affected cantons classified by priority type of intervention
Province Canton 1997
population
(projection)
Poverty
incidenc
e
Illiteracy
rate
Medical
personnel
(x 10,000)
Deaths
due to El
Niño
Wounded
due to El
Niño
Damaged
houses
(% of total)
No. of
affected
families
No. of
affected
persons
Evacuated
population
(% of total)
Severely
affected
population
(% total)
Pupils not
assisting
schools
due to El
Niño
Type
(policy
priority)
 EL ORO Machala 186,115 29.9% 12.8% 51.3 0 0 0.1% 116 531 0.1% 0.0% 4625 B
Arenillas 21,627 50.9% 20.4% 19.4 0 0 1.6% 58 326 1.6% 0.0% 2252 A
Atahualpa 7,244 42.8% 21.0% 12.4 1 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
El Guabo 33,133 53.7% 23.5% 7.8 0 0 1.8% 87 440 0.5% 0.1% 0 D
Huaquillas 32,836 38.9% 18.8% 5.8 2 0 5.0% 260 1160 5.8% 0.1% 7965 B
Pasaje 60,704 38.3% 19.2% 14.8 1 0 0.0% 1 5 0.3% 0.0% 610 A
Portovelo 12,112 37.3% 20.6% 16.5 0 0 0.1% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
Santa Rosa 60,060 40.9% 18.0% 21.6 3 0 18.2% 914 3069 4.4% 1.8% 7836 B
 ESMERALDAS Esmeraldas 185,908 46.3% 24.9% 24.5 25 38 2.6% 629 1095 1.2% 1.1% 8565 A
Eloy Alfaro 29,981 72.3% 52.7% 19.0 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Muisne 26,614 70.0% 51.2% 12.4 2 0 2.8% 101 510 0.0% 0.3% 0 D
Quinindé 89,194 72.1% 40.8% 10.0 0 0 1.5% 10 60 0.3% 0.4% 2041 D
San Lorenzo 26,631 64.6% 44.2% 23.7 0 2 0.1% 0 0 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
Atacames 18,939 69.5% 37.5% 7.9 0 0 0.0% 1 6 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
 GUAYAS Guayaquil 1,854,450 51.6% 11.8% 45.8 18 5 0.2% 712 2704 0.1% 0.1% 2621 A
Alfredo
Baquerizo
Moreno
19,193 62.9% 37.7% 3.1 0 0 1.6% 21 106 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
Colimes 22,711 72.1% 48.7% 1.3 1 0 0.3% 315 50 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Daule 83,958 59.0% 36.2% 10.5 3 0 0.0% 2 10 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Durán 100,606 24.4% 14.6% 13.0 2 3 0.1% 307 38 0.0% 0.1% 0 A
El Empalme 47,196 58.1% 35.0% 12.5 0 0 1.1% 50 190 0.1% 0.0% 0 D
El Triunfo 29,857 54.4% 30.0% 9.0 2 0 3.3% 208 646 0.5% 0.1% 0 D
Milagro 137,451 34.5% 20.3% 22.5 3 0 0.4% 243 1075 0.1% 0.5% 492 A
Naranjal 46,605 54.2% 32.2% 13.5 0 0 1.0% 557 2007 0.1% 7.3% 250 B
Naranjito 27,935 50.5% 31.2% 11.5 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 65 D
Palestina 13,215 66.6% 46.8% 1.5 1 0 3.1% 335 467 4.8% 0.6% 727 C
Pedro Carbo 37,349 69.7% 44.7% 6.4 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Salinas 38,301 51.2% 22.5% 20.1 0 0 0.0% 140 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
Samborondón 40,109 57.8% 32.2% 4.5 2 0 1.2% 44 207 0.5% 0.0% 1696 D
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Province Canton 1997
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(projection)
Poverty
incidenc
e
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rate
Medical
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affected
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Santa Elena 99,206 63.1% 26.7% 16.6 1 0 0.2% 864 1620 0.2% 6.0% 513 B
Santa Lucía 32,288 63.2% 44.4% 3.7 0 0 0.3% 282 50 0.2% 0.0% 1283 D
Urbina Jado 51,737 71.6% 38.2% 3.7 1 0 3.9% 549 94 2.1% 0.0% 301 C
Yaguachi 46,436 56.5% 29.0% 10.6 0 0 0.1% 16 118 0.3% 0.0% 38 D
Playas 25,377 48.7% 25.6% 9.1 0 0 0.0% 15 251 0.1% 0.0% 1019 A
Coronel
Marcelino
Maridueña
9,557 23.2% 15.2% 63.8 1 0 1.0% 16 20 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
Lomas de
Sargentillo
12,568 67.3% 44.1% 6.4 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
Nobol 11,973 56.9% 34.4% 5.0 0 0 0.3% 167 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
La Libertad 62,714 45.2% 20.0% 14.7 1 0 0.0% 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0 A
 LOS RIOS Babahoyo 124,549 52.9% 27.8% 29.8 7 2 1.0% 184 821 0.9% 0.1% 4351 A
Baba 34,725 74.7% 46.2% 9.5 3 0 1.1% 53 269 0.6% 0.1% 1840 D
Montalvo 22,464 64.8% 33.9% 6.7 1 0 1.5% 36 114 0.1% 0.2% 723 D
Puebloviejo 26,761 65.0% 38.7% 3.7 1 0 0.2% 8 39 0.1% 0.0% 282 D
Quevedo 199,921 54.0% 29.3% 11.5 3 2 0.5% 144 648 0.1% 0.0% 974 B
Urdaneta 27,702 61.0% 37.4% 14.1 0 0 0.2% 0 0 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
Ventanas 69,074 64.1% 33.1% 7.1 1 0 0.2% 14 79 0.1% 0.0% 2368 D
Vinces 64,044 66.6% 36.5% 9.5 1 0 2.3% 230 1179 0.5% 0.0% 4648 D
Palenque 21,542 79.4% 52.3% 0.9 0 1 1.3% 69 244 0.0% 0.3% 0 D
Buena Fé 20,387 79.7% 42.7% 7.4 0 0 0.1% 2 9 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
 MANABI Portoviejo 238,670 40.2% 24.7% 27.6 17 8 4.8% 1061 6842 0.6% 1.3% 10027 B
Bolívar 44,377 66.3% 37.6% 13.1 2 0 1.6% 96 480 0.2% 0.1% 0 D
Chone 136,564 60.1% 35.3% 17.0 7 0 1.3% 244 1060 0.1% 0.1% 436 C
El Carmen 63,850 65.6% 35.8% 8.3 1 0 0.2% 10 50 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Flavio Alfaro 27,884 75.9% 43.8% 4.7 3 0 0.2% 4 29 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Jipijapa 81,690 60.3% 37.7% 15.1 1 1 0.7% 67 437 0.1% 0.2% 200 C
Junín 21,246 72.7% 38.1% 8.9 1 0 5.9% 91 461 1.2% 1.9% 122 D
Manta 156,840 33.8% 25.1% 37.9 2 5 0.7% 122 603 0.0% 0.2% 133 A
Montecristi 44,472 59.2% 41.6% 8.3 5 8 1.7% 94 387 0.4% 0.2% 1565 D
Paján 50,124 73.8% 50.3% 8.8 5 0 0.9% 31 188 0.3% 0.4% 689 D
49
Province Canton 1997
population
(projection)
Poverty
incidenc
e
Illiteracy
rate
Medical
personnel
(x 10,000)
Deaths
due to El
Niño
Wounded
due to El
Niño
Damaged
houses
(% of total)
No. of
affected
families
No. of
affected
persons
Evacuated
population
(% of total)
Severely
affected
population
(% total)
Pupils not
assisting
schools
due to El
Niño
Type
(policy
priority)
Pichincha 34,041 78.3% 50.2% 4.1 0 0 0.8% 25 125 0.0% 0.2% 0 D
Rocafuerte 30,728 64.3% 32.0% 13.0 0 0 2.1% 56 258 0.4% 0.7% 902 D
Santa Ana 58,404 72.4% 46.4% 8.0 24 16 2.4% 163 852 0.5% 0.4% 1115 D
Sucre 88,992 59.4% 36.3% 27.4 22 32 5.3% 429 2247 7.5% 1.5% 2895 C
Tosagua 37,526 67.9% 37.9% 2.9 0 0 0.6% 22 144 0.2% 0.1% 182 D
24 de Mayo 40,181 75.5% 48.6% 6.7 1 0 1.2% 26 132 0.0% 0.7% 0 D
Pedernales 35,240 77.5% 52.4% 3.7 6 0 0.4% 4 21 0.0% 0.3% 0 D
Olmedo 11,658 77.4% 55.5% 10.3 0 0 12.9% 214 50 0.0% 1.3% 0 D
Puerto López 16,095 67.7% 45.7% 5.0 3 0 2.4% 34 168 0.1% 0.7% 286 D
AZUAY Cuenca 390,904 36.6% 22.9% 53.2 6 3 0.2% 83 418 0.0% 0.0% 84 A
Santa Isabel 20,264 76.8% 35.9% 18.8 0 0 0.6% 53 285 1.4% 0.1% 0 D
 BOLIVAR Guaranda 78,223 69.1% 47.5% 30.7 12 0 0.0% 7 35 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Chillanes 24,181 82.1% 43.9% 15.7 1 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Echeandía 11,597 65.9% 34.8% 13.8 0 0 2.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
San Miguel 33,117 70.2% 35.1% 16.9 0 0 0.1% 3 12 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Caluma 11,606 63.1% 31.7% 12.9 0 0 0.2% 5 25 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
 CAÑAR La Trocal 38,426 65.0% 30.2% 13.3 2 0 0.4% 8 147 0.3% 0.5% 403 D
 COTOPAXI La Maná 24,483 75.5% 33.5% 9.8 5 0 2.1% 65 268 0.5% 0.4% 549 D
Pujilí 52,364 78.4% 51.2% 15.5 0 0 0.0% 3 8 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
 CHIMBORAZO Riobamba 193,403 48.0% 28.2% 28.2 3 2 0.0% 11 60 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
Alausí 47,378 82.4% 59.4% 12.0 2 1 0.5% 64 309 0.0% 0.2% 0 D
Chunchi 15,930 75.6% 48.6% 19.5 7 4 1.0% 10 43 0.0% 0.5% 0 D
Pallatanga 11,197 83.9% 50.5% 7.1 0 0 0.3% 4 18 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Cumandá 10,081 78.1% 38.0% 8.9 0 0 4.9% 74 440 0.0% 1.3% 0 C
 IMBABURA Ibarra 141,107 47.2% 23.0% 28.2 0 0 0.0% 4 20 0.0% 0.0% 0 A
 TUNGURAHUA Ambato 268,993 42.2% 24.2% 29.2 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 B
 LOJA Calvas 34,716 77.2% 26.9% 13.3 3 1 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Celica 16,921 75.0% 29.9% 11.8 4 0 0.4% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Espíndola 21,481 92.2% 44.3% 14.4 9 11 0.3% 3 15 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
Gonzanamá 20,401 83.6% 35.2% 8.3 1 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Macará 21,588 68.7% 21.9% 17.6 3 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
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Paltas 39,856 83.8% 33.6% 10.8 1 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 D
Puyango 19,844 78.8% 34.3% 17.6 2 0 2.6% 85 425 1.0% 0.0% 50 D
Zapotillo 12,085 86.1% 41.1% 13.2 3 0 3.1% 61 305 0.0% 0.2% 0 D
 MORONA
SANTIAGO
Santiago 10,000 78.1% 25.9% 69.0 0 0 0.9% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 B
 NAPO Tena 42,213 80.3% 28.5% 29.1 1 0 0.1% 0 0 0.0% 0.2% 0 D
La Joya de
los Sachas
19,122 93.1% 35.9% 6.8 0 0 0.6% 0 0 0.0% 0.7% 0 D
Orellana 23,233 78.3% 24.0% 22.4 1 0 0.9% 5 36 0.0% 4.5% 0 D
Loreto 9,533 98.2% 39.8% 12.6 1 2 1.0% 10 8 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
 PASTAZA Pastaza 39,411 63.5% 29.9% 44.4 0 1 2.2% 12 58 0.0% 0.8% 0 C
Mera 7,023 47.2% 16.1% 61.2 2 2 0.2% 0 0 0.0% 0.2% 0 A
 ZAMORA
CHINCHIPE
Zamora 27,404 65.0% 22.0% 32.1 10 0 0.7% 0 0 0.0% 0.2% 0
Chinchipe 14,665 89.1% 27.1% 29.3 0 0 0.1% 0 0 0.0% 0.1% 0 C
Nangaritza 5,097 84.7% 24.3% 13.7 0 0 0.1% 0 0 0.0% 0.1% 0 D
Yantzaza 14,468 78.2% 26.8% 25.6 0 0 1.1% 85 196 0.0% 0.8% 0 C
El Pangui 6,681 87.6% 36.8% 16.5 0 1 3.7% 23 137 0.0% 3.0% 0 D
El Cóndor 5,749 84.8% 31.4% 0.0 0 0 1.0% 9 54 0.0% 0.0% 0
 GALAPAGOS San Cristóbal 4,255 23.9% 8.7% 0.0 0 0 0.8% 4 30 0.0% 0.3% 0
Source:  Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998); SIISE.
